In this paper, using properties of Ramanujan sums and of the finite Fourier transform of arithmetic functions, we give an explicit formula for the number of solutions of the linear congruence
Introduction
Let a 1 , . . . , a k , b, n ∈ Z, n ≥ 1. A linear congruence in k unknowns x 1 , . . . , x k is of the form
(1.1)
where ϕ(n) is Euler's totient function and the products are taken over all prime divisors p of n. This result was rediscovered later by Dixon [15] and Rearick [49] . The equivalent formula The special case of k = 2 was treated, independently, by Alder [1] , Deaconescu [12] , and Sander [50] . For k = 2, the function N n (2, b) coincides with Nagell's totient function ( [41] ) defined to be the number of integers x (mod n) such that (x, n) = (b − x, n) = 1. From (1.2), one easily gets Interestingly, the function N n (2, 1) was applied, by D. N. Lehmer [32] , in studying certain magic squares. It is also worth mentioning that the case of k = 2 is related to a long-standing conjecture due to D. H. Lehmer from 1932 (see, [12, 13] ), and also has interesting applications to Cayley graphs (see, [50, 51] ).
The problem in the case of k variables can be considered as a 'finite analogue of the Goldbach problem' in the ring Z n of residue classes modulo n ( [15] ), and can also be viewed as a 'restricted partition problem modulo n' ( [43] ), or an equation in the ring Z n , where the solutions are its units ( [12, 50, 51] ). More generally, it has connections to studying rings generated by their units, in particular, in finding the number of representations of an element of a finite commutative ring, say R, as the sum of k units in R; which itself has close interaction with algebraic graph theory (see, [25] and the references therein). The results of Ramanathan [47, Th. 5 and 6] are similar to (1.2) and (1.3), but in another context. See also McCarthy [36, Ch. 3] and Spilker [55] for further results with these and different restrictions on linear congruences.
The general case of the restricted linear congruence 6) was considered by Sburlati [52] . A formula for the number of solutions of (1.6) was deduced in [52, Eq. (4) , (5)] with some assumptions on the prime factors of n with respect to the values a i , t i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and without a clear proof. The special cases of k = 2 with t 1 = t 2 = 1, and a i = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ k), of (1.6) were considered, respectively, by Sander and Sander [51] , and Sun and Yang [58] . Also, the special case of b = 0,
, is related to the orbicyclic (multivariate arithmetic) function ( [33] ), which has very interesting combinatorial and topological applications, in particular, in counting non-isomorphic maps on orientable surfaces (see, [33, 37, 38, 59, 65] ).
The above general case of the restricted linear congruence, (1.6), can be considered as relevant to the generalized knapsack problem. The knapsack problem is of significant interest in cryptography, computational complexity, and several other areas. Micciancio [39] proposed a generalization of this problem to arbitrary rings, and studied the average-case complexity of it. This generalized knapsack problem, proposed by Micciancio [39] , is described as follows: for any ring R and subset S ⊂ R, given elements a 1 , . . . , a k ∈ R and a target element b ∈ R, find x 1 , . . . ,
where all operations are performed in the ring.
In the one variable case, Alomair et al [2] , motivated by applications in designing an authenticated encryption scheme, gave a necessary and sufficient condition (with a long proof) for the congruence ax ≡ b (mod n), with the restriction (x, n) = 1, to have a solution. Later, Grošek and Porubský [20] gave a short proof for this result, and also obtained a formula for the number of such solutions. In Theorem 3.1 (see, Section 3), we deal with this problem in a more general form as a building block for the case of k variables (k ≥ 1).
In Section 3, we obtain an explicit formula for the number of solutions of the restricted linear congruence (1.6) for arbitrary integers a 1 , t 1 , . . . , a k , t k , b, n (n ≥ 1). Two major ingredients in our proofs are Ramanujan sums and the finite Fourier transform (FFT) of arithmetic functions, of which properties are reviewed in Section 2. In Section 4, we review universal hash functions, discovered by Carter and Wegman [9] , and propose a generalization of this construction by allowing the keys, x's, to be chosen from Z * n k . In Section 5, we generalize the authenticated encryption scheme proposed by Alomair et al [2] in a way which is also applicable to handle long messages; thereby obtaining a way to expand the message space. Then, using our explicit formula from Section 3, we analyze the integrity of this scheme.
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we use (a 1 , . . . , a k ) to denote the greatest common divisor (gcd) of a 1 , . . . , a k ∈ Z, and write a 1 , . . . , a k for an ordered k-tuple of integers. Also, for a ∈ Z\ {0}, and a prime p, we use the notation p r || a if p r | a and p r+1 ∤ a.
Ramanujan sums
Let e(x) = exp(2πix) be the complex exponential with period 1, which satisfies for any m, n ∈ Z with n ≥ 1,
For integers m and n, with n ≥ 1, the quantity
is called a Ramanujan sum. It is the sum of the m-th powers of the primitive n-th roots of unity, and is also denoted by c(m, n) in the literature. Ramanujan sums and some of their properties were certainly known before Ramanujan's paper [48] , as Ramanujan himself declared in [48] ; nonetheless, probably the reason that these sums bear Ramanujan's name is that "Ramanujan was the first to appreciate the importance of the sum and to use it systematically", according to Hardy (see, [17] for a discussion about this).
Ramanujan sums have important applications in additive number theory, for example, in the context of the Hardy-Littlewood circle method, Waring's problem, and sieve theory (see, e.g., [40, 42, 63] and the references therein). As a major result in this direction, one can mention Vinogradov's theorem (in its proof, Ramanujan sums play a key role) stating that every sufficiently large odd integer is the sum of three primes, and so every sufficiently large even integer is the sum of four primes (see, e.g., [42, Chapter 8] ). Ramanujan sums have also interesting applications in cryptography [34, 53] , coding theory [18, 56] , combinatorics [33, 37] , graph theory [30, 35] , signal processing [61, 62] , physics [44, 45] , and several other places.
Even though the Ramanujan sum, c n (m), is defined as a sum of some complex numbers, it is integer-valued (see, Theorem 2.1, below). From (2.2), it is clear that c n (−m) = c n (m). Clearly, c n (0) = ϕ(n), where ϕ(n) is Euler's totient function. Also, by Theorem 2.1 or Theorem 2.3 (see below), c n (1) = µ(n), where µ(n) is the Möbius function defined by
if n is not square-free, (−1) κ , if n is the product of κ distinct primes.
(2.
3)
The following theorem, attributed to Kluyver [26] , gives an explicit formula for c n (m):
Theorem 2.1. For integers m and n, with n ≥ 1,
Thus, c n (m) can be easily computed provided n can be factored efficiently. One can compare (2.4) with the formula
By applying the Möbius inversion formula, Theorem 2.1 yields the following property:
The case m = 1 of (2.6) gives the characteristic property of the Möbius function:
Note that Theorem 2.1 has several other important consequences:
Corollary 2.2. Ramanujan sums enjoy the following properties:
(Note that the function m → c n (m) is multiplicative for a fixed n if and only if µ(n) = 1.) Furthermore, for every prime power p r (r ≥ 1),
von Sterneck [64] , in his work on a kind of integer partition problems modulo an integer, employed the number The equality (2.10) is widely attributed to Hölder [23] , while Kluyver [26] had already discovered it about thirty years before Hölder [23] (see, [17] for a discussion about this). There are several names for Theorem 2.3 in the literature, for example, Hölder's theorem, the Dedekind-Hölder theorem, and von Sterneck's formula.
Ramanujan sums satisfy several important orthogonality properties. One of them is the following identity (see [11] , [17 
We close this subsection by mentioning that, very recently, Fowler et al [17] showed that many properties of Ramanujan sums can be deduced (with very short proofs!) using the theory of supercharacters (from group theory), recently developed by Diaconis-Isaacs and André.
The finite Fourier transform
A function f : Z → C is called periodic with period n (also called n-periodic or periodic modulo n) if f (m + n) = f (m), for every m ∈ Z. From (2.2), it is clear that c n (m) is a periodic function of m with period n.
We define the finite Fourier transform (FFT) of an n-periodic function f as the function f = F (f ), given by
Then the inverse finite Fourier transform (IFFT), that is, the Fourier representation of f is obtained as (cf., e.g., [40, p. 109 
The Cauchy convolution of the n-periodic functions f 1 and f 2 is the n-periodic function
It is well known that
More generally, if f 1 , . . . , f k are n-periodic functions, then
(2.14)
For t | n, let ̺ n,t be the n-periodic function defined for every m ∈ Z by
We will need the next two results. The first one is a direct consequence of the definitions.
Theorem 2.5. For every t | n,
in particular, the Ramanujan sum m → c n (m) is the FFT of the function m → ̺ n,1 (m).
As already mentioned in Corollary 2.
Proof. Group the terms of (2.12) according to the values d = (m, n), taking into account the definition of the n-even functions.
Linear congruences with
In this section, using properties of Ramanujan sums and of the finite Fourier transform of arithmetic functions, we derive an explicit formula for the number of solutions of the restricted linear congruence (1.6) for arbitrary integers a 1 , t 1 , . . . , a k , t k , b, n (n ≥ 1).
Let us start with the case that we have only one variable; this is a building block for the case of k variables (k ≥ 1). The following theorem generalizes the main result of [20] , one of the main results of [2] , and also a key lemma in [43] (Lemma 1).
Theorem 3.1. Let a, b, n ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1 be given integers. The congruence ax ≡ b (mod n) has solution(s) x with (x, n) = t if and only if t | (b, n) and a,
. Furthermore, if these conditions are satisfied, then there are exactly
incongruent solutions, where d = a,
If x is such that ax ≡ b (mod n) and (x, n) = t, then x = ty and Ay ≡ B (mod N). Conversely, since (A, N) = 1, the congruence Ay ≡ B (mod N) has a unique solution y 0 = A −1 B modulo N and (Ay 0 , N) = (B, N), that is (y 0 , N) = 1. It follows that a(ty 0 ) ≡ b (mod n), which shows that x 0 = ty 0 is a solution of ax ≡ b (mod n).
Hence, all solutions of the congruence ax ≡ b (mod n) with (x, n) = t have the form x = t(y 0 + kN), where 0 ≤ k ≤ d − 1 and y 0 + kN, n t = 1. Since (y 0 , N) = 1, the latter condition is equivalent to (y 0 + kN, d) = 1. The number S of such solutions, using the characteristic property of the Möbius function, (2.7), is
Here, if v = (N, δ) > 1, then v ∤ y 0 since (y 0 , N) = 1. Thus, the congruence kN ≡ −y 0 (mod δ) has no solution in k and the inner sum is zero. If (N, δ) = 1, then the same congruence has one solution in k (mod δ) and it has d δ solutions (mod d). Therefore,
The proof is now complete.
Corollary 3.2. The congruence ax ≡ b (mod n) has exactly one solution x with (x, n) = t if and only if one of the following two cases holds:
Proof. If d = 1, then (3.1) shows that there is one solution. Now for d > 1 it is enough to consider the case when d = p j (j ≥ 1) is a prime power. Let p r || n, p s || t with 0 ≤ j + s ≤ r.
Then, by (3.1), there is one solution if
This holds only in the case p = 2, j = 1, s + j = r. This gives d = 2 together with the conditions formulated in (ii).
We remark that Corollary 3.2, in the case of t = 1, was obtained in [20, Cor. 4] . Now, we deal with the case of k variables (k ≥ 1). We note the following multiplicativity property: Let N n (t 1 , . . . , t k ) denote the number of incongruent solutions of (1.6) and let n, m ≥ 1, (n, m) = 1. Then
This can be easily shown by the Chinese remainder theorem. Therefore, it would be enough to obtain N n (t 1 , . . . , t k ) in the case n = p r , a prime power. However, we prefer to derive the next compact results, which are valid for an arbitrary positive integer n.
In the case that a i = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ k), we prove the following result.
The number of solutions of the linear congruence
Note that Sun and Yang [58] obtained a different formula (with a longer proof) for the number of solutions of the above linear congruence (in Theorem 3.3), but we need the above equivalent formula, (3.3), for the purposes of this paper. We also remark that the special case of b = 0,
which was shown ([59, Prop. 9]) to be equivalent to the orbicyclic (multivariate arithmetic) function ( [33] ) defined by
The orbicyclic function, E(m 1 , . . . , m k ), has very interesting combinatorial and topological applications, in particular, in counting non-isomorphic maps on orientable surfaces, and was investigated in [33, 37, 59 ] (see, also, [38, 65] ).
In what follows, we give the proof of the formula (3.3). In fact, we offer two 'minimal' proofs to show that only basic properties of Ramanujan sums and of the FFT, respectively, are required. The first one is a slight modification of the proof of [59, Prop. 21] .
Proof. First method. Put
By Corollary 2.2/(iii) and the associativity of gcd,
finishing the proof.
Second method. Now we apply the properties of the FFT. Observe that
1 is exactly the number N n (k, b, t 1 , . . . , t k ) of solutions of the given restricted congruence. That is,
Therefore, by (2.14) and Theorem 2.5,
and the IFFT formula, (2.13), gives
The properties (3.4) show that m → c n t 1
is an n-even function. Now, by applying Theorem 2.6, the proof follows. Now, using Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, we obtain the following general formula for the number of solutions of the restricted linear congruence (1.6).
6)
Proof. Assume that the linear congruence
. By Theorem 3.3, the number of solutions of the linear congruence
Now, given the solutions y 1 , . . . , y k of the latter congruence, we need to find the number of solutions of a i x i ≡ y i (mod n), with (x i , n) = t i (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Since a i ,
so by Theorem 3.1, the latter congruence has exactly
solutions. Combining (3.7) and (3.8) we get the formula (3.5).
Furthermore, applying von Sterneck's formula, (2.10), we deduce
where, denoting by [a, b] the lcm of the integers a and b,
.
By inserting (3.9) into (3.5), we get (3.6).
Remark 3.5. For fixed a i , t i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and fixed n, the function
is an even function (mod n). This follows from the formula (3.5), showing that
is a linear combination of the functions b → c d (b) (d | n), which are all even (mod n) by (2.4). See also (3.4).
Remark 3.6. In the case of k = 1, by comparing Theorem 3.1 with formula (3.5) and by denoting t 1 d 1 = s, we obtain, as a byproduct, the following identity, which is similar to (2.11) (and can also be proved directly): If b, n ∈ Z, n ≥ 1, and s | n, then
If in (1.6) one has a i = 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then clearly, there are solutions x 1 , . . . , x k if and only if b ≡ 0 (mod n) and t i | n (1 ≤ i ≤ k), and in this case there are ϕ(n/t 1 ) · · · ϕ(n/t k ) solutions. Now, assume that there is an i 0 such that a i 0 = 0. For a prime p and j ≥ 1 let
and let 3.7. Let a i , t i , b, n ∈ Z, n ≥ 1, t i | n (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and assume that a i = 0 for at least one i. Consider the linear congruence 
11)
where the last product is empty and equal to 1 if b = 0.
Proof. For a prime power n = p r (r ≥ 1) the inner sum of (3.6) is 
, the other terms are zero. We deduce by using (2.6) and (2.8) that
Now assume that m p = m ≥ r + 1. Then p r | a i t i for every i and (a i t i , p j ) = p j for every j with 0 ≤ j ≤ r. Hence, by using (2.6),
Inserting into (3.6) and by using the multiplicativity property (3.2) the proof is complete. Proof. Use the first part of Theorem 3.7 and examine the conditions under which the factors of the products in (3.11) vanish.
Example 3.9. 1) Consider 2x 1 + x 2 + 2x 3 ≡ 12 (mod 24), with (x 1 , 24) = 3, (x 2 , 24) = 2, (x 3 , 24) = 4. Here 24 = 2 3 · 3, 2 | a 1 t 1 = 6, 2 | a 2 t 2 = 2, 2 | a 3 t 3 = 8, so, e (1)
2 = 2 and m 2 = 2, also 2 = 1 for every prime p | n, and it is easy to see that from Theorem 3.7 and Corollary 3.8 we reobtain Theorem 3.1.
The following formula is a special case of Theorem 3.7 and was obtained by Sburlati [52] without a clear proof.
where
for any x = x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ Z k p , and any
It is well-known that MMH * is a universal family of hash functions ( [9, 21] ).
Theorem 4.3. The family MMH * is a universal family of hash functions.
Now, we introduce a generalization of the MMH * by allowing the keys, x's, to be chosen from Z * n k .
Definition 4.4. Let n and k be positive integers. We define the family BLF as follows:
for any x = x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ Z * n k , and any
Clearly, BLF is a multilinear map (in fact, a bilinear form). It is easy to see that BLF is not universal, or even ε-almost-universal (ε-AU), for all positive integers n. But it would be an interesting question to investigate for which values of n, BLF is universal, or ε-AU (see, also, [14] ).
An authenticated encryption scheme based on the BLF family
In this section, we propose an authenticated encryption scheme based on the BLF family defined in Section 4. Then, using our results from Section 3, we analyze the integrity of this scheme. We recall that two important notions in cryptography are secrecy and integrity. Encryption only provides secrecy, but in many cases (e.g., financial transactions) we need integrity (or authenticity), as well. These notions, secrecy and integrity, are orthogonal, and in particular a cryptographic scheme that offers even perfect secrecy makes no guarantees with respect to integrity. The latter property requires an additional mechanism, namely a message authentication code (or MAC), also known as a cryptographic checksum or a keyed hash function, defined formally as [24] : Definition 5.1. A MAC is a tuple of algorithms (Gen, Mac, Vrfy):
• Gen is a key generation algorithm; a randomized algorithm that returns a key k.
• Mac is a tag generation algorithm; a randomized and/or stateful algorithm that takes a key k and a message m and returns an authentication tag t. This is usually written as: t ← Mac k (m).
• Vrfy is a verification algorithm; a deterministic algorithm that takes a key k, a message m, and an authentication tag t, and returns Vrfy k (m, t) ∈ {0, 1}. (0 for false and 1 for true.)
We require that for every key k, and every m ∈ M (where, M is a message space),
Note that the adversary has a goal to 'forge' the MAC, that is, to produce any pair (m, t) such that Vrfy k (m, t) = 1. Message authentication codes (MACs) were invented in 1974 by Gilbert, MacWilliams, and Sloane [19] , using ideas from projective spaces over finite fields. Their system is fast, but has two drawbacks: it requires keys longer than the length of messages, and also a new key for every message.
There are three common approaches to MACs: constructing MACs based on block ciphers (such as DES), based on cryptographic hash functions (such as MD5), and based on universal hash functions. The latter, discovered by Wegman and Carter [66] (which is usually referred to as the Wegman-Carter paradigm), is one of the most widely used MAC constructions. In this scheme, the legitimate parties share a secret hash function drawn randomly from an ε-A△U family of hash functions, and a secret encryption key (a sequence of random onetime pads). A message is authenticated by first hashing it with the shared hash function and then encrypting the resulting hash value with the shared encryption key (shared onetime pad). Note that one-time pads are of the length of the hash value rather than of the length of the message. The resulting encrypted hash value, called an authentication tag, is transmitted together with the message (as a pair). Upon receiving this pair, the legitimate party recomputes and validates it.
Constructing MACs based on universal hash functions is stunning from several points of view. For example, even if an adversary who has unbounded computational power performs q black-box oracle queries to both algorithms used by the MAC, then the probability to forge the MAC is at most qε (see, [28, 66] ). Black et al [7] best describe the reasons that MAC constructions based on universal hashing is one of the most widely used MAC constructions and "why universal hashing?" as: "the above approach is a promising one for building a highly-secure and ultra-fast MAC. The reasoning is like this: the speed of a universal hashing MAC depends on the speed of the hashing step and the speed of the encrypting step. But if the hash function compresses messages well (i.e., its output is short) then the encryption shouldn't take long simply because it is a short string that is being encrypted. On the other hand, since the combinatorial property of the universal hash function family is mathematically proven (making no cryptographic hardness assumptions), it needs no "overdesign" or "safety margin" the way a cryptographic primitive would. Quite the opposite: the hash function family might as well be the fastest, simplest thing that one can prove universal. Equally important, the above approach makes for desirable security properties. Since the cryptographic primitive is applied only to the (much shorter) hashed image of the message, we can select a cryptographically conservative design for this step and pay with only a minor impact on speed. And the fact that the underlying cryptographic primitive is used only on short and secret messages eliminates many avenues of attack. Under this approach security and efficiency are not conflicting requirements -quite the contrary, they go hand in hand."
Several computationally secure MACs based on universal hash functions have been proposed following the Wegman-Carter paradigm; see, e.g., [6, 7, 16, 21, 22, 27, 57, 66] and the references therein.
Encryption schemes that are provably secure even against an adversary who has unbounded computational power are called perfectly secret. Roughly speaking, a encryption scheme is perfectly secret if the distributions over messages and ciphertexts are independent.
Formally, let M be the space of messages, C the space of ciphertexts and K the space of keys. An encryption scheme is a tuple of randomized functions (Gen, Enc, Dec), where Gen is a key generator and for any k ∈ K and m ∈ M, the encryption and decryption functions Enc, Dec satisfy Dec(k, Enc(k, m)) = m. Let M denote an arbitrary distribution on M, and K denote the distribution on K produced by Gen. This induces a distribution on C, which we denote by C. We now give the definition of perfect secrecy developed by Shannon [54] . This means that the ciphertext should not leak any information about the underlying plaintext. In other words, the a priori probability of a message m ∈ M is the same as the a posteriori probability of the message m given the corresponding ciphertext.
There are several methods to construct authenticated encryption (AE) schemes. One of these methods is "generic composition", in which an encryption scheme and an authentication scheme are 'appropriately' combined. There are three different approaches to authenticated encryption by generic composition: authenticate-then-encrypt (AtE), encrypt-thenauthenticate (EtA), and encrypt-and-authenticate (E&A). SSL uses a variant of AtE, IPSec uses a variant of EtA, and Transport Layer of SSH uses a variant of E&A. See [5, 29] and the references therein, for a detailed discussion about these generic constructions and their security analysis.
Let us consider the original universal hash function family discovered by Carter and Wegman [9] . Fix m and n, and choose a prime p ≥ m. For all a, b ∈ Z p , define
Carter and Wegman [9] showed that the family H := {h a,b | a, b ∈ Z p , with a = 0} is universal. Note that in using this universal hash function family for message authentication, two keys, a and b, and two modular operations in Z p , one addition and one multiplication, are needed. Also, in order to get message integrity and perfect secrecy, the message should be encrypted with a one-time pad (OTP) first, and then the encrypt-then-authenticate (EtA) approach is applied; thus, three keys and three modular operations are needed. However, Alomair and Poovendran [4] proposed an authenticated encryption scheme which tries to reduce the key size for achieving authentication. In fact, their scheme needs only two keys, and two modular operations in Z p , one addition and one multiplication, but provides the same level of message integrity and also perfect secrecy. Later, Alomair et al [2] generalized this scheme by allowing operations to be performed over Z n (n ≥ 1) instead of Z p , and analyzed the security of this construction. Note that the latter construction does not provide perfect secrecy, in general; in fact, perfect secrecy is achieved only if messages are restricted to belong to Z * n ([2, Cor. 5.1]). See, also, [3] for an application of this approach in the authentication problem in RFID systems. In what follows, we generalize their scheme ( [2] ) in a way which is also applicable to handle long messages; thereby obtaining a way to expand the message space. Then, using our explicit formula from Section 3, we analyze the integrity of this scheme.
Set up
In this scheme, the legitimate parties share a secret hash function, say Υ x , drawn randomly from the BLF family, and a secret encryption key, say
n is authenticated by separately and simultaneously hashing it with the shared hash function
and encrypting it with the shared encryption key
The resulting hash value, called an authentication tag, and the encrypted message are transmitted together (as a pair). Upon receiving this pair, the legitimate party recomputes and validates it.
Message integrity
Assume that the legitimate party has received the ciphertext Ψ In fact, the extracted message, m ′ , is valid if and only if the linear congruence (5.6) holds. Clearly, there are two cases for examining the integrity of this scheme, namely, modifying the ciphertext only, and modifying both the ciphertext and the authentication tag.
Modifying the ciphertext only
Suppose an adversary has modified the ciphertext Ψ x ′ to Ψ ′ x ′ . Upon receiving, the system extracts (the modified ciphertext) Ψ has a solution x 1 , . . . , x k , with (x i , n) = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Now, applying Corollary 3.8, one can determine exactly all the cases that the extracted message, m ′ , will pass the integrity check (5.6).
Modifying both the ciphertext and the authentication tag
Suppose an adversary has modified the ciphertext Ψ x ′ to Ψ ′ x ′ . Upon receiving, the system, similar to the above, extracts (the modified ciphertext) Ψ has a solution x 1 , . . . , x k , with (x i , n) = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Now, again, applying Corollary 3.8, one can determine exactly all the cases that the extracted message, m ′ , will pass the integrity check (5.6).
Concluding remarks
As we have mentioned, the number of solutions of some special cases of the linear congruence a 1 x 1 + · · · + a k x k ≡ b (mod n), with (x i , n) = t i (1 ≤ i ≤ k), have found very interesting applications in number theory, combinatorics, and cryptography, among other areas. In this paper, we obtained an explicit formula for the number of solutions of this linear congruence in its most general form, that is, for arbitrary integers a 1 , t 1 , . . . , a k , t k , b, n (n ≥ 1), and also gave an application of our explicit formula in designing an authenticated encryption scheme. As this problem has appeared in several areas in mathematics and computer science, so we believe that our formulas will have implications in these or other applications and directions.
